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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose: Drawing on sociological theories of Giddens, Bourdieu and Goffman, we explore 
how different relationships are characterized between actors in interaction and determine 
whether social theories of practice resonate as being practical to business marketers.  
Design/methodology/approach: In our empirical investigations, we employ the Delphi 
Method whereby we 'elevate' 6 highly experienced marketing practitioners in Dubai and 
Bangkok, each in different industries and from different cultural backgrounds, to designated 
‘expert’ positions in exploring the practical relevance of the practice-based theories of 
Bourdieu, the dramaturgy of Goffman and the structuration theory of Giddens in 
understanding practical experiences of managing in business (B2B) networks.  
Findings: Our results show that aspects of these theories are consistent with practitioners’ 
experiences in many ways but the theories themselves do not appear to resonate with the 
modernist practical consciousness of our participants as being particularly pragmatic or 
practically useful except as resources they could selectively borrow from as bricoleurs of 
changing action.  
Originality/value: Social practice theories appear rather too abstract and complex to 
practical actors. It is therefore paradoxical that social practice theories do not appear as 
sufficiently ‘handy’ or ‘ready-to-hand’ in Heidegger’s (1962) terms; being in need of 
translation into practical usefulness. It would appear that social practice theories can be a 
useful analytical vehicle for the academic analyst but cannot resonate with the modernist 
consciousness of the practical actor. 
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Introduction 
Rationalistic thinking and statistical logic were for a long time in social science privileged 
over embodied influences upon judgment (Kahneman, 2011, p. 8). Social sciences from the 
1970’s were inclined to assume that people were generally rational. In this view embodied 
influences, such as emotions and intuitions, were retardants to the obvious benefits of 
rationality. Western ‘Enlightenment’ thinking promotes and privileges rational and 
‘foundationalist’ logic, where thinking/knowledge should precede speech and action. In the 
Aristotelian / Cartesian West, language is crucially important for establishing the logic of the 
“knowledge-creation-application-performance” sequence (Chia, 2003, p. 953) because the 
knowledgeable person must first have a command of rhetoric to be effective and convincing. 
In Western cultures, knowing is a prerequisite of action and knowing is accomplished 
through language. To act rationally requires you to know what you are doing and to know 
what you are doing requires you to be able to communicate before doing it. 
This paper explores the complexities involved in comparing rationalist logic and some 
antifoundationalist alternatives provided by social practice theorists. This alternative 
emphasizes that actors interact through complex ‘self-organizing’ processes within different 
relationships and in different contexts. In other words, the antifoundationalist approach 
suggests that the practical world is largely a product of its own invention and action is not 
simply a dependent variable responding to mental structures as the independent variable. 
Thus, our overall research objective is to explore how different relationships are 
characterized between actors in interaction and whether social theories of practice resonate as 
being practical to these business marketers. 
Mintzberg (1973) has long identified that, in practice, managers and management is 
far from rational, linear or nomothetic. Mintzberg (1990) was forced to repeat that the 
folklore of scientific management is alien to the realities of fast paced, discontinuous, 
embodied, intuitive, ritualized and personalistic variety in the practical life of the manager. 
Elsewhere it has been proposed that through interaction “relationships and networks are 
essentially formed by interpersonal communication processes which, in turn, are affected by 
their contextual and structural factors” (Olkonnen et al., 2000, p. 405). As social theorists of 
practice, both Bourdieu and Goffman emphasize how communicative and other practices are 
key to understanding social life and along with Giddens, argue that social practice is a 
complex phenomenon (Campell-Hunt, 2007). Actors are neither governed by codes of 
behaviour and comprehension, scripts or social schema nor do they have complete agency 
when enacting them. Language and communication are embodied, visceral activities and not 
just reflections of thought. Discourse is therefore a principal site of resolution of explicit and 
tacit influences. It involves brokerages of influences into a sufficiently loose consensus that 
permit possibilities for actors to carry on interacting and code-sharing despite their 
differences. These differences involve embodied/cognitive, social/individual, conscious/sub-
conscious, general/situated, scripted/improvised and structural/processual tensions that 
simultaneously bear upon the unfolding of realities in practice. 
Despite differences and often conflicts in ideas, identities, interests/power and 
feelings, perceptions and emotions, actors can usually find ways to trade, co-ordinate and co-
operate through discursive and other brokerage practices. Formal and informal interaction, 
from this viewpoint, involves a mix of different embodied habits and rules, conditions, 
contexts or situation and varieties of objects in order to turn differences into temporary, 
workable similarities. This involves both the interaction of explicit compromises and the 
interpassivity of tacit compromises. Interpassivity is the ubiquitous but rather unnoticed 
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routine substituted interaction that goes without saying, involving ‘going through the 
motions’ expected of a persona, the ritual enactments of masked identities of characters, the 
unspoken cultural script adherence and compliant, ritualized or semi-automatic traditions of 
politeness. 
 
The embodied self 
Bourdieu and Goffman are both post-Cartesian social theorists because they both reject 
Mind-Body dualism and both elevate the importance of embodied experience in social 
interaction. The mind as the independent variable and the body (action) as the dependent 
variable are no longer relevant in their post-structuralist and post- interpretivist theories. The 
importance of a ‘felt sense’ of immediate, practical, corporeal perceptions and interactions 
central to both Bourdieu and Goffman’s understanding of practical existence have been 
somewhat masked, “excluded, marginalized or overlooked” (Styhre, 2004, p. 101) in prior 
theorizing. Heidegger (1962) described a ‘moody’, embodied pre-understanding of the 
human agent already coping with the world with a ‘ready to hand’ practicality before she 
analyses or abstracts it. This embodied ‘skillful coping’ is irreducible and largely inaccessible 
to thought or language but nevertheless critical in collaboration with thought and language in 
constituting the existential picture of being-in-time. Heidegger (1988) used the notion of 
Dasein to describe this pure, embodied ontology that frames being-in-time in practical 
interaction of ‘being-with-others’ and ‘being-in-the-world’ as the only feasible picture. In this 
un-separated, embodied engagement, all human actors are connected through time and 
embodiment with other actors and objects in established, socio-material, enacted practices. 
As a result the fullness of this pre-objective, practically enacted, actively engaged, embodied 
world precedes all of our conceptual schemas (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) and is inaccessible 
through a subject-object epistemology of scientific rationality.  
Embodied perceptions, talk (and other communication) and ideas about the 
relationship, particularly through personal and non-commercial engagement, transform 
during the process of relationship development. Ethnographic evidence suggests that such 
embodied experience is provided in trade shows where touching products and speaking to 
other network members whilst ‘looking them in the eye’ through ritualized and habituated, 
affective interactions are a critical part of the dramas of on-going buying processes (Borghini 
et al., 2006).  
Sensemaking involves, from this perspective, embodied, abductive picturing to signal 
what to do next and who we are (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012) in juxtaposition with tales to 
justify our actions. Humans do not think then act, they think, act and communicate 
simultaneously, holistically and in self-organizing ways. The critical role of the embodied 
imagination in this process of embodied picturing, as originally expressed by Giambattista 
Vico, [1668-1744] is re-affirmed by Ricoeur (1978). The moving pictures that produce sense 
within tropes in relating one domain to the other are dependent upon the interactions of 
imagination between speaker and listener. Ricoeur (1978) holds that these connections are 
based upon an embodied ‘intuitive grasp’ of immediate perception that subsequently 
incorporates discourse and cognition. The imagination for Ricoeur (1978) schematizes 
similarities of domains, pictures and sensemaking from the images generated, and then 
confers concrete dimensions to a re-configured, re-pictured imagination. Through a ‘moving 
picture’ metaphor (Purchase et al., 2010), this paper subscribes to the view that “in 
sensemaking, the essential task is to create a coherent and plausible account of what is going 
on without ever really seeking a one true and final picture of how the world actually is” 
(O’Leary and Chia, 2007, pp. 392-393). As a consequence, imagination, embodied feelings 
and cognition are ‘co- conspirators’ within discourse for the creation of dynamic, moving 
pictures through imaginative, symbolic interaction. 
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Contributions of Bourdieu and Goffman 
In order to provide a theoretical lens for our study, a combination of theories drawn mainly 
from Pierre Bourdieu and Erving Goffman was used. Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) post-Cartesian 
sociological theories emphasize how various ‘species’ of capital are combined in use in a 
social field to establish a position of influence, advantage and power and where “social 
practices, i.e. socially shaped activities performed by individual actors, [are] at the centre of 
his analysis (van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 2013, p. 355). Actors use combinations of capital 
forms (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) to anchor positions in field networks of 
relations. Positions therefore depend upon the amount of capitals and their attributed coded 
weightings which actors are able to acquire and control in the field. There is field competition 
to win control in the species of capital that carries the greatest coded weight in the field 
through combined use of all capital forms. So, for example, knowledge (a form of cultural 
capital), connections (a form of social capital) and prestige/reputation (forms of symbolic 
capital) can be marshaled to try to monopolize economic capital, if that is the dominant 
weighted code for the species of capital in the field. Such games, however, are subject to 
potential inertia of social capital. Innovation and new knowledge creation, for example, is 
facilitated by stronger, closer and multiple ties but can be subject to a kind of epistemic 
diseconomy. For example, close, established relationships can become stagnant, neglect 
‘weak ties’ or diminish novelty when too many relationship connections dilute productive 
relationships developing (McFadyen and Cannella, 2004) or the network becomes overly 
‘designed’ (Håkansson and Ford, 2002). Power, is the framing influence upon capital game-
playing in all fields. Power is a master code which sets the rules of the games by establishing 
the hierarchical structures of relationship ‘habitus’ within all fields (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). 
Habitus is the shared, habituated schema and internalized embodiment of the codes, 
conventions and general rules of engagement, thought and action determined in the field, its 
composition of species of capital (and their relative weightings) and the frameworks of power 
that configure them. It provides transmission mechanisms for codes of behavior, predisposing 
the ‘modus operandi’ for establishing an identity relative to the identity set within the 
network field through configuring which actions are identifiable (Chia and Holt, 2006). From 
this point of view, identities develop as encoded within the, mostly tacit, prevailing 
parameters of codes of acceptability of behavior, action and practice constraints. Habitus 
develops from the structuration of practices and sensemaking interpretations of what 
purposes these actions serve. It involves the reciprocal emergence between practicing or 
enacting realities and their social representations. Habitus also accounts for social 
distinctions, which determine code frames for hierarchies of taste within the structures 
established to differentiate those with approved capital within the power-framed field from 
those without. Bourdieu recognizes that habitus does not entirely determine thought and 
action as actors do have a degree of agency in their enactments and are not fully conscious of 
their habitus at all times. Actors usually behave pragmatically and this action can sometimes 
be outside of the encoded rules of the game that habitus allows the actor to internalize 
through embodiment and cognition. In effect practitioners often employ bricolage to get 
around norms and employ their tacit knowledge of local practice and their repertoire of 
embodied, emic codes (Halme et al., 2012). Habitus is, however, likely to usually cultivate a 
particular, habitual and established way of seeing relationships according to encoded 
predispositions and to frame under which circumstances formal or informal language is 
appropriate. In established relationships of ‘being’, the habitus of the relationship is likely to 
generate relative stability in how the parties feel, act, talk to and think about each other unless 
some unexpected and surprise event, such as a betrayal, unravels the stability of expectations 
of the rules of engagement both parties have of each other. 
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If Bourdieu provides a theoretical lens to help us understand how identity positions 
can become established in coded games of relationship building practices, Goffman (1956, 
1974) provides a complementary understanding of the performativity framing process 
required to enact them. Bourdieu provides answers to ‘what’ and Goffman provides answers 
to ‘how’ actors can make relationships work in practice. Goffman describes the 
performativity framing processes actors use in order to accomplish ‘alignments’ of display 
with shared cognitive presuppositions. Goffman argues that social acts require the creation of 
masks appropriate for identification of roles framed by schemata. The actor in socially acting 
is performing a role according to how that role is recognizable on the stage where the 
performance takes place. This is manifested in terms of, for example, alignments in 
displaying appropriate politeness and forms of address consistent with shared understanding 
of mutual status and the nature of the relationship parties believe they are in. 
If Bourdieu provides the ontological contents of codes required for understanding 
practices of everyday interaction, Goffman provides an equally important understanding of 
the images used in the semiotic displays enacting these codes. Put another way, if Bourdieu 
provides a description of experience in the theatres of practice, Goffman provides a 
description of its performances. In Goffman’s (1974) terms, the actor’s performativity 
involves displaying a recognizable character as an appropriate identity (Lowe et al., 2012), 
requiring displays of alignment with culturally scripted roles / stereotypes and activities or 
framing of action. Actors must perform within tolerances prescribed by their code-framed, 
scripted roles as configured by cultural expectations about their gender, age, class, status and 
power (Tannen, 1994). In other words, the actor ‘figures out’ and intuits through interaction 
with other actors, in the context of a repertoire of prior performances made in similar stages, 
what frame is appropriate for the role she should perform as a character in the situation. She 
improvises from experience what she should do and say, for example, as a woman with a 
persona in a role where she carries a certain status and enacts the type of relationship 
common to the role in the scene she interprets she is in. This framing is prescribed for 
Goffman through scripts and schemas, and in Bourdieu’s terms, by the ‘species of capital’ at 
her disposal and within the confines of the habitus conferred on a woman like her in a role 
situation like this. The level of formality or informality in interaction, consequently, is a 
confluence of appropriate discourse used in decoding the role the actor is in for the kind of 
stage, the type of theatre, the sort of performance required by the type of casting and the 
variety of script in play at the time, subject to performative improvisations.  
In theatres of practice there are multiple scripts, varieties of theatres and stages, many 
different performances by different actors with different interpretations and varying talent. A 
good empirical example of the multiple theatrics of relationships is provided by Fuller and 
Lewis (2002) who explore the multiple meaning of relationships within a small business 
context. In their paper, the actors’ network theories (Håkansson and Johanson, 1993) frame 
their different enacted interpretations. Fuller and Lewis (2002) demonstrate that different 
ethnomethods of business owners are created through different meanings of relationships 
framed through different behaviours and different discourses.  
 
 
Market making 
In response to moves towards a ‘practice turn’ in marketing, some researchers have adopted a 
Goffmanesque performative idiom which directs attention to the emergent and unfolding 
practices that actors engage in to ‘shape’, iteratively (re)frame, construct and problematize 
markets by focusing upon ‘market making’ through co-creation of markets and their 
representations (Araujo et al., 2008; Andersson et al., 2008; Finch and Acha, 2008) and 
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characterizations / re-conceptualizations of marketing practitioners in performing marketing 
(Hagberg and Kjellberg, 2010). 
Markets are therefore different and often conflicting discursive forms and material 
practices across multiple contexts over time. The market making approach recognizes the 
embodied nature of practice through the provenance of the practice turn in other social 
science disciplines but particularly in Actor Network Theory. It adheres to the call for social 
realities to be best understood through ‘site ontology’ (Schatzki, 2005) where social and 
material mechanisms and practices happen together in the moment and markets are made in a 
nexus of such bundled practices. Some market making researchers suggest that the symbolic 
struggle to represent markets is one infused with power and self-interest (Rinallo and 
Golfetto 2006; Kjellberg and Helgesson, 2006, 2007) but most accept that markets are made 
through multiple, often conflicting practices of exchanging, normalizing and representing 
Kjellberg and Helgesson (2006, 2007). 
A similar approach is evident when Patterson et al. (2012) demonstrate that the 
embodied, heuristic ability of intuition is privileged over rational, logical evaluations 
amongst marketing managers in many contexts. Such corporeality has also been prominent in 
phenomenology, feminist theory, theories of practice and postmodern theory that “share the 
emphasis on human experience as being a fundamentally embodied experience” (Styhre, 
2004, p. 110). Bloom and Cederstrom (2009) propose that contemporary market fantasies 
weave narratives with embodied emotions in order to afford an effective source of ideological 
control. Epistemes are enacted by masked actors through active engagement (resistance or 
compliance) with powerful metanarratives in charades of truth-building through time. As a 
result, human reality makers are able to selectively identify aspects of phenomenological 
experience, name and identify elements of the world and determine (or rather invent) causal 
relations between elements that provide ‘cues’ to enable them to ‘make sense’ of the world in 
discourse and through interaction and interpassivity. Sensemaking, therefore, always involves 
paradoxical tensions between the tacit and the explicit, inside and outside, ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ 
and intended and unintended. From this perspective, symbolic interaction takes place within 
an ‘ideology of everyday life’; a local, lived, embodied and practical meaningfulness through 
storied episodes of ‘language gaming’ in response to interpretations of past events and in 
abductive anticipation of their projected consequences for the future.  
 
Relationships as practice 
For a fuller theoretical justification of the practice turn, we have to go into the ‘strategy-as-
practice’ (SAP) literature. The approach focuses upon the strategizing practices of actors, 
which is consonant with a pluralistic understanding of practical social realities. SAP research 
quite often focuses upon the role of discourses in mediating between action and cognition or 
in enacting strategy through strategizing practice (Denis et al., 2007). In other words, 
discourse is a principal mediation between the cognitive generalizations of strategic plans and 
the everyday, embodied pluralism of heterogeneous and fragmented practices and routines in 
strategizing. 
Rasche and Chia (2009) explore social practices and their consequences for strategic 
practice. They identify the genealogy of strategy as practice and describe two source 
approaches as what they call neo-structuralist and neo-interpretivist. In doing so they identify 
the synergies of combining these two source approaches. This proposed combination 
provides justification and support for the approach proposed in this paper because Bourdieu 
is a key author within the neo-structuralist school and Goffman within the neo-interpretivists. 
The proposed combined approach emphasizes Goffman’s performativity and Bourdieu’s 
habitus as internalized and embodied rules of the games as equally important. It comes along 
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with an emphasis upon material practices in terms of acquisition and deployment of ‘species 
of capital’ in the playing of the games. 
The strategy as practice approach is interested in social practices as a way to explain 
everyday strategizing action and how actors actually ‘do strategy’. This is why Rasche and 
Chia (2009, p. 714) are interested in the “social theories of practice” of Bourdieu and 
Goffman. In doing so they identify elements to be considered when conceptualizing and 
researching strategy practices as embodied routines (habits, rituals etc.), use of objects, 
identity constitution through practice and background, tacit knowledge in situ. This paper 
supports the position of Suddaby, Seidl and Lê (2013) who suggest a combined strategy-as-
practice and neo-institutional lens that focuses on what actors actually do, their shared 
cognitions, and the role of language in creating shared meanings. These elements are all 
consistent with our descriptions, using a theatrical metaphor, of the need for simultaneous 
understanding of both ontological contents and semiotic images in dramas of relationship 
interaction. In exploring relationships through social theory, we are similarly interested in 
how practitioners ‘do relationships’. In particular, we are interested in how discursive 
practices (distinguishing formal and informal) are an important currency for this doing. 
Thus far, this paper has mainly reviewed the literature in furthering the argument that 
different relationships are characterized by differences in styles of formality of discourses 
between actors in interaction. Before concluding, we highlight a brief empirical illustration of 
certain facets of this argument via a Delphi study (Linstone and Turoff, 1975). 
  
Methodology 
 
Context 
The ‘practice turn’ sees practice as embodied, materially enabled sets of human activities 
organized around shared practical understandings (Schatzki, 2001). Rasche and Chia (2009, 
p. 721) outline the research requirements for investigating practices as requiring focus upon 
lived experiences in terms of routinized bodily performances in the form of ‘bodily sayings 
and doings’. Reflections on these bodily sayings and speech acts can be therefore an initial 
form of exploration to be complemented by subsequent ethnographic observations that gets 
closer to the live action of bodily sayings and doings in different contexts. This study 
therefore, is a precursor to subsequent intended ethnographic research where we subscribe to 
Van Maanen’s (2015, p. 35) ‘ethnography as a social practice’. It explores what experiences 
and conventions practitioners reflect upon what/how/why they would usually say (and would 
tend to avoid saying) in the practices of relationship development. In particular, our interest 
focuses upon identifying boundaries of conventions for formalities and informalities in their 
bodily sayings that our practitioners navigate as bricoleurs of everyday dramas of practice. 
These bricoleurs have “intimate knowledge of the human, material, and symbolic resources 
of their organization, and their thinking is based on proximity, rather than on the abstraction 
induced by many contemporary management methods” (Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010, p. 
148). 
This paper seeks to identify the practitioner’s criteriology of talking sense in the close 
proximities of lived experience as a significant aspect of making sense as embodied subjects 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962) who engage with realities practically through lived experience and not 
simply as detached, rational cognitive agents. Practice research from this perspective seeks to 
identify the practical, ‘skillful coping’ employed by practical actors who by sensing 
situations, through practiced aptitudes, provide an ‘intentional arc’ of appropriate action 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). In other words, “sensemaking is a temporal process of making our 
life and ourselves sensible through embedded and embodied narrative performances” 
(Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012, p. 66). As a consequence:- 
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transformation of mere sensitiveness into conscious sensibility and meaningful 
and creative ‘sense’ (-making) is processed bodily. To ‘make sense’ of something 
literally means that embodied sensual processes can convert realities and symbols 
into sensory felt, but also meaningful experiences (Küpers, 2011, p. 6). 
 
Identities are created and re-created using bodily sayings in practice through 
successfully exchanged displays of credibility, legitimacy and performative effectiveness. In 
the theatres of practice, rational analysis does not always precede action when often “One 
does something, one counts oneself as (declares oneself) the one who did it, and, on the basis 
of this declaration, one does something new” (Žižek, 2006, p. 16). Semiotic communication 
is seldom completely direct as actors are engaged in a rather complex interactive games 
similar to ‘charades’ where embodied pictures and mimes have to be transmitted indirectly 
and through abductive guesswork into articulated meanings through the naming of identities, 
concepts and ideas. Bodily sayings are consequently often dependent upon body language as 
much as speech. This study is also an exercise in giving voice to the practitioner to comment 
on the voracity, relevance and usefulness of the social practice theories used in this study. As 
experts in practice, the practitioner is given license to examine and reflect upon the practical 
usefulness of social theories of practice. For this reason, the Delphi Method has been chosen 
as the methodology to accomplish these aims. 
The Delphi method is designed to obtain the most reliable consensus of a group of 
experts on a particular topic of interest (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963) and it essentially can be 
characterized as a method for structuring an effective group communication process to deal 
with a complex problem. This involves a structured communication process in which there is 
feedback of individual contributions of information and knowledge; assessment of the group 
perspective; an opportunity for individuals to revise their perspectives; and some degree of 
anonymity for the individual responses (Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004). 
This is important since judgmental information is often present and Delphi avoids 
direct confrontation of experts through a series of questions interspersed with controlled 
opinion feedback. Dalkey and Helmer (1963) note that controlled interaction aids experts in 
the gradual formation of a considered opinion.  
The Delphi method is deemed particularly suitable when the problem can benefit from 
subjective judgments on a collective basis and when the selected experts represent diverse 
backgrounds of experience and expertise (Linstone and Turoff, 2002, p. 4) 
The most popular versions of the Delphi method include: the ranking-type used to 
develop group consensus about the relative importance of issues; forecasting and issue 
identification/prioritization to either develop a consensus opinion or to emphasize differences 
of opinion in order to develop a set of alternative future scenarios; as well as 
concept/framework development which typically involves identification/elaboration of a set 
of concepts followed by classification/taxonomy development (Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004). 
In terms of philosophical basis, Scheele (2002) links the Delphi method to a Merleau-
Pontyean view of reality as a negotiable construct. As part of the interaction during the 
Delphi study, the experts involved construct and reflect on their own group reality. 
 
The study 
Delphi studies were conducted in Dubai and Bangkok during 2014. Participants were 
experienced (20+ years) expatriate marketing managers in senior roles. They were 
purposively selected based on their length of management experience, their different cultural 
backgrounds and work experience in different industries. In individual interviews, 
participants were asked to reflect on their typical management practices, habits and rituals. In 
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the course of the interview, the interviewers then introduced the social practice theories of 
Bourdieu, Goffman and Giddens and asked the practitioners to comment on their relevance 
and practical usefulness in making sense of their own management practices. The 
introduction of social practice theories during the Delphi interviews were in line with 
Scheele’s (2002) conceptualization of the Delphi researcher’s role to introduce “what if” and 
“why not” questions to prompt consideration of new conceptions. The content of each 
interview was transcribed and shared with the other participants within their particular city. 
Participants were asked to comment on each other’s reflections both in terms of consensus 
and differences of opinion. All participants within a city were then invited to a group 
discussion where they engaged in collaborative sense-making based on their prior individual 
reflections.  Where embodied metaphors were used in expression, these are highlighted in the 
text. 
 
Findings 
 
In Dubai 
Andy, a senior Scottish expatriate salesperson in the Water Industry, used the embodied 
metaphor of ‘handling’ problems in attempts at ‘keeping balls in the air’ whilst ‘knowing 
which ones can be dropped’ to describe his embodied, bricolaged activities. He emphasized 
the need to be ‘quick on your feet’ and to recognize that different contexts require different 
performances and an ability, perfected through experience, of knowing what to say and what 
not to say in any given situation. This involved ‘handling’ ambiguities so that negatives, such 
as problems with products or deliveries if ‘handled properly’ could be turned into positives, 
such as improved relationships. 
Similarly Anwar, an Egyptian senior telecoms executive, suggested that dexterity 
required ‘embracing’ changes and not ‘hiding’ from new technologies. His remarks supported 
Andy in that he also emphasized the importance of discretion needed after learning things 
over the years that required knowing what not to say and, particularly, when not to divulge 
certain things in the public domain in order to maintain trust. Anwar also emphasized the 
dexterity required in different situations, such as dealing with people who you know well as 
opposed to those with whom you are not familiar. He emphasized that he attributed his 
success in doing this to maintaining a basis of interpersonal and ethical standards with 
everyone upon which he felt that he could then build different approaches for different 
contexts. 
Rajiv, the third interlocutor in our Delphi study in Dubai is a senior executive in an 
American logistics company. He emphasized that in practice activity for him varied 
considerably. Activities varied from fairly structured periods when bigger projects dominated 
and less structured activities outside of project-dominated periods. Despite this fluctuation, 
Rajiv emphasized that bricolaged informality, ‘impromptu’ decisions, speed and delegated 
trust to his subordinates was the norm in his medium-sized business, which was a subsidiary 
of a family firm that was established in Philadelphia in the 1960s. Rajiv emphasized that trust 
and empowerment, encouragement and support of his staff who he stressed were ‘given 
room’ to make mistakes was his priority. He wondered whether this level of informality 
could be sustained as he was embarking on an expansion that would involve a trebling of the 
staff. He was encouraged by a willingness on the part of the parent company to give him the 
power to decide how to continue managing successfully and intimated that if this had not 
been the case, he would have ‘moved on’. 
 
In Bangkok 
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Hans is a German owner of a software company employing both Thai and international staff 
who had started and developed the business relying heavily upon ‘gut feeling’. He had 
appointed a manager; Dimitri (a Russian born Jew) to run the company and Dimitri was our 
second participant. Hans had learned to speak Thai over his time in Bangkok, which he 
described as like ‘diving’ into the paradoxical game of Thai culture. He was now mainly 
involved in executive training, using concepts that he had employed successfully in practice 
as a basis of helping managers in Thailand to improve their practice and performance. Moira, 
our third Bangkok participant, is a Scottish expatriate and senior manager in a ‘high-end’ 
serviced apartment property in Bangkok managing 70 + all Thai staff with particular 
responsibility for ‘juggling’ 8 senior Thai managers. The company provided international 
companies with accommodation solutions for senior executives posted as expatriate managers 
to Bangkok. 
Hans and Dimitri used many management concepts to make sense of their fast-
moving business that relied upon providing innovative solutions to IT problems. Dimitri 
declared himself as averse to habits in practice and explained that he constantly forced 
himself to break habits when he noticed them. For Dimitri, habits were ‘robotic’ and to him 
were an enemy of innovation and entrepreneurship. Hans was a champion of using Myers-
Briggs personality profiling and the Balanced Scorecard as principal sensemaking devices 
and Dimitri had adopted these with equal enthusiasm.  Moira saw her role as ‘herding cats’ 
and had instituted formal systems of internal management control to ensure consistency of 
practice to enable her to ‘not upset the applecart’ and provide consistency that her clients 
expected, particularly in terms of customer service. Hans and Dimitri agreed that much of 
their role involved improvisation and bricolage. Moira was more focused upon establishing 
formal policies and procedures  and  was a little frustrated that responsibility for any 
creativity which ‘fell’ solely upon her and she did not believe that such artistry could be 
dissipated in an all-Thai workforce or even confidently shared with her more senior 
managers.  Hans was the most explicit articulation of the understanding of manager 
(entrepreneur) as bricoleur and unprompted comprehensively described his improvisational 
existence. 
However, whilst this aspect of post-structuralist and post-interpretivist social practice 
theory was supported, much of the rest was regarded with suspicion. Only Moira supported a 
Goffmanesque view of managerial performativity and dramaturgy in that she, and the rest of 
her company, recognized the importance of separation of ‘front stage’ smiles from ‘back 
stage’ operational problems which involving frequently ‘playing down’ the dramas, 
controlling affective disorganization by wearing appropriate ‘masks’ to avoid consequences, 
(which would otherwise ‘come back to bite you’) of not maintaining rigorous and 
comprehensive control. Hans confessed to having to act contrary to his ‘authentic’ self out of 
necessity at times but felt that such acting left him not feeling ‘comfortable in my own skin’ 
and Dimitri said that he always acted authentically and was never acting. 
Although aspects of social practice theory were accepted and resonated with 
experience, the antifoundationalist tenor of much of this theory was largely rejected. Hans 
and Dimitri felt that they used Myers-Briggs for ontologically ‘real’ access to the 
personalities of themselves, their employees and other stakeholders and insisted that, in 
practice, this worked. Myers-Briggs profiling explained the diversity of reactions to events 
and interventions and allowed identities (both internal and external- although they seemed to 
be projecting profiles onto some stakeholders abductively) to be determined so that 
everybody could predict within tolerable limits what everybody else was likely to say and do 
in most situations. Presented with the possible anti-foundational notion that the social 
construction of identities could be leading to the enactment of these through consequent 
playing of assigned roles and thus was rather a self-fulfilling prophecy was rejected. Here the 
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suggestion was intimated that, for example, a Myers-Briggs profiling could actually be acting 
as a script for behavior; enactment of the profile could be confirming the profiling schema 
rather than the ‘real’ identity of actors through Myers-Briggs accurately predicting their 
consequent behavior. Whilst not taking up this antifoundational possibility, Hans and Dimitri 
both accepted that if their view was not ‘working’ they would not persist with Myers-Briggs. 
After the interview they immediately and confidently began to profile the researchers’ 
personalities using the Myers-Briggs framework. The pragmatic imperative for all the 
Bangkok practitioners seemed to be the most resolute philosophy; if it’s not broke, don’t fix it 
but if it’s not working, try something else was their shared attitude. As with most of the 
interlocutors in Dubai, the Bangkok participants were fairly resolute in their realist ontology; 
they mostly saw themselves as dealing with real problems in situations and with real people 
and, in the main, were determined to defend a real and authentic self in everyday practice and 
in fair-dealing with stakeholders. 
 
Conclusions 
The findings of the Delphi study largely confirm the marketing manager experts’ bricolaged 
existence in that they all seem to some extent to use their experience as a sail to get through 
regular but unpredictable storms of uncertainty. Social practice theories describe how they 
behave with credibility. That structures and agency are co-creations through sensemaking 
frames of practical consciousness or habitus seems to feasibly explain their condition. That 
the codes and schemata of these sensemaking resources, as symbolic operationalizations of 
their beliefs, are used abductively seems to be borne out by our study. Our ‘practical experts’ 
describe their embodied rituals of interaction and use ubiquitous embodied metaphors to 
express this through analogical reasoning as expected in embodied realism (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999). 
The complex heterogeneity inherent in embodied ritual analysis is reinforced by the 
subjective nature of ritual experience. Turner’s (1967) "multivocality" expresses the 
ambiguity of ritual symbolism; where each symbol has a "fan" or "spectrum" of referents, 
such that each is open to an assortment of possible interpretations in a given social drama. 
Consequently, rituals are liable to have "multiple, complex, ambiguous and changing layers 
of meaning that are only partly articulated, understood, or acknowledged by participants" 
(Kunda, 2006, p. 94) in a given performance. The effect is that rituals encompass both action 
and depiction; they are sites of material and symbolic mediation through which meaning is 
negotiated and constructed rather than simply reflected (McLaren, 1999). 
There is also a strong 'improvisational' theme of bricolage that is apparent which 
harkens to Weick’s (1998) jazz metaphor. Our expert practitioners’ experience can be likened 
to an instrument that they play with embodied skill so that they feel confident that they can 
interpret the tune of any episode with relative ease. They often 'play by ear' through skillful 
interaction using a repertoire upon which they continue to build. Their pragmatism is resolute 
and they all appear to have loyalties to concepts only as long as they are working. They can 
be regarded as bricoleurs of trust building and they navigate, through using 'metos', 
successful routes across relational spaces into the harbors of productive agreements. 
Essentially, they appear to regularly ‘compose’ solutions to whatever issues present 
themselves - improvising ‘in the moment’. In this sense, their improvisation is also 
innovative where action emerges via “bodily expressive-responsive skilful coping” (Yakhlef 
and Essén, 2012, p. 881). The abductive use of action and discourse inferred in their 
responses has been described as ‘habitus’ by Bourdieu (1977, 1990) or ‘practical 
consciousness’ by Giddens (1984). In this, structure and agency comes to bear on outcomes 
in context. Practical consciousness helps to explain practical understanding, developed 
through experience so “that specific modes of discourse must be employed in particular 
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contexts in order for their opinions, ideas, or argumentations to be seen as legitimate and 
worth attention” (Heracleous and Hendry, 2000, p. 1264). 
The antifoundationalist tenor of post-structuralist and post-interpretivist social 
practice theory represented by Bourdieu, Goffman and Giddens, however, appears alien and 
impractical to the sensibilities of our participating practitioners who appear to see themselves 
and their lives largely in modernist terms; determined by putatively linear but unpredictable, 
causal factors that they constantly seek to identify, measure and control. Their worldview and 
self-perceptions appear more sympathetic with the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and the 
interpretivism of Shultz than the post-structuralism and post-intepretivism of Bourdieu, 
Goffman and Giddens. Given that practices are constituted by embodied skills, discourses, 
tacit understandings and perceptions that have developed in a modernist era, their practicality 
is oriented towards foundational causes. This orientation is not only mental, it is a habitus, a 
holistic embodied, discursive and cognitive orientation; a way of being and their practical 
consciousness and the tacit understandings they have are cause and effect and privilege 
reason. The more projective imagination of social practice theories, with their non-
determinism and greater affording of symbols and semiotics etc., may explain them 
adequately, the game metaphor or the theatre metaphor explains why and how they 'play' at 
social life but it is not an episteme with which they could comfortably apply in practice 
currently as tacitly they don’t see the simple causes they can change to make effective 
changes in effects they are conditioned to seek.  
Thus, the social practice theories represented by Bourdieu, Goffman and Giddens may 
be useful for the academic observer to understand their world but, it appears to the marketing 
managers, at present at least, insufficiently pragmatic, too abstract and ‘impractical’ for most 
of them to help them in their struggles as every day, adaptive bricoleurs in pragmatic action. 
They were mainly resistant to the nominalistic assumptions of social practice theories - they 
said more than once that what they did was ‘real’ - not a theatrical play or a game. In 
Giddens’ terms, their practical consciousness, perhaps because of the longstanding influence 
of modernism, is emphatically realist and mainly objectivist and therefore, the nominalistic 
and subjectivist assumptions of social practice theories faces resistance in the practical 
consciousness of the marketing managers thus rendering them impractical and difficult to 
understand or apply. 
The contribution of this paper is in suggesting that social practice theories are taken as 
ontic/epistemic rather than ontological/epistemological. That is, practitioners’ practical 
consciousness is geared towards ‘being’ and ‘knowing’ rather than theorizing about being 
and knowing and that social practice theories appear to them as too theoretically-focussed to 
be of immediate practical use. They appear to favour modernist tools such as Myers-Briggs, 
SWOTS, PESTS and Balanced Scorecards which chime with their essentialist predispositions 
and which they regard as more 'ready to hand' as opposed to the more antifoundationalist 
social practice theories which appear more 'present at hand'. In moving forward, existing 
(positivist and interpretivist) paradigms do not appear conducive to a reconciliation between 
practice and theory but a Phronetic Paradigm might offer that prospect (Kavanagh, 2013).  
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